The Jerusalem Post

Aug. 14, 2002

Voir : Traduction française

I heard Amram Mitzna's name for the first time during the Lebanon War 20 years ago. It therefore doesn't surprise me that he is now putting himself forward as a knight in shining armor, his own candidate for prime minister. Even then, while still in uniform, with the rank of brigadier-general, he started dabbling in politics and finally reached the position of mayor of Haifa.
That ought to be his limit.

In August 1982 the IDF succeeded in expelling Yasser Arafat and his 10,000 terrorists from Beirut. This historic move, under the leadership of prime minister Menachem Begin and defense minister Ariel Sharon, has now once again been proven to have been vital to the defense of Israel. Now the majority of Israelis are prepared to see Arafat expelled from the gates of Jerusalem.

That success in 1982 aroused a wave of jealousy and hatred in the Labor Party and the Left, who organized demonstrations and propaganda campaigns against the war and made political capital out of the number of IDF casualties sustained in it, an unprecedented act in the history of the country.

At the time, I served as defense minister Sharon's media adviser. I closely followed these moves that originated in the Labor Party's fear that the success of Begin and Sharon in that war would lead to Sharon's taking over from Begin in due course. What would then be the fate of the power-hungry leaders of the Labor Party? These personal and party interests were also reflected in attacks in the media and in demonstrations by the Left against Begin and Sharon while the fighting continued in Lebanon.

Therefore, when on the eve of Rosh Hashana 1982 Christian Arabs (Falangists) slaughtered Moslem Arabs (Palestinians) in Sabra and Shatila, the politicians of the Labor Party and the Left rushed to dance on this blood in order to attack Begin and Sharon and accuse them of guilt for a slaughter in which they were not involved.

"Begin is a murderer!" "Sharon is a murderer!" wrote the inciters of the Left on their banners, which were also publicized in the world media.

In that atmosphere of political lynching created by Sharon's opponents who were jealous of his success in defeating the PLO in Lebanon and expelling Arafat, I told Sharon that the commission of enquiry set up by the government to investigate the tragic event would cause him to be deposed, despite his lack of guilt in the affair. Therefore when I heard on the radio that brigadier-general Amram Mitzna had informed the CGS, Raphael Eitan, that "he was going home" in protest and was demanding Sharon's resignation, I was amazed. How could a senior IDF officer present an ultimatum to the defense minister?

This was on the eve of Yom Kippur 1982, 10 days after the slaughter in Sabra and Shatila. In my office in the Ministry of Defense, I inquired who Mitzna was. I was told that he was the chief of staff of an armored corps, numbering about 1,000 tanks, which fought against and halted the Syrian armor in the Lebanon War.

But there were grave questions regarding the failure of this force in the Sultan Ya'akub battle, and it was still not clear to what degree Mitzna was responsible for this failure. I was also told that the defense minister had approved Mitzna's request to meet with prime minister Begin to present his charges and accusations against Sharon regarding the Lebanon War. However, Begin rejected Mitzna's version out of hand. Did Mitzna wish to blur his responsibility for the failure of the Sultan Ya'akub battle, by blaming the defense minister?

I immediately phoned Sharon, who was not in his office, to tell him about the "ultimatum" that Mitzna had sent him over the radio, in which he also referred to his meeting with Begin. I also told him of the protocol of a meeting between several IDF generals in which Mitzna criticized the political leadership. The discussion centered around how to assign the responsibility for the failures in the Lebanon War to several senior officers and the defense minister. This was totally unthinkable behavior in a democratic country.

Sharon phoned CGS Eitan and told him to inform Mitzna that he had the choice of returning at once to his military position or of being fired immediately. After I heard this from Sharon, I worried that this clear message from the defense minister to brigadier-general Mitzna would be broadcast at once on the radio before they shut down for Yom Kippur.

The day after Yom Kippur, Mitzna returned to his position in the Staff College. It seems that this great hero was not prepared to risk his job, to resign and protest. I therefore drew the conclusion that his arguments and claims as "a man of principle" against defense minister Sharon were not enough for him to give up for the sake his job, his car, and his comfortable terms of service in the IDF.

The next day, Sharon convened a meeting of the IDF generals in which he gave them a lesson about the army and democracy, what was permissible and what was not, in the light of Mitzna's improper behavior.

Now that everyone knows that Mitzna's views are close to those of the radical Left and that he is prepared to conduct negotiations with Arafat and to make deep territorial withdrawals, perhaps it is more comprehensible that he acted like a politician in 1982, when as a brigadier-general he made his undemocratic and unsuccessful ploy against Sharon.

* The writer is the Mideast correspondent of The New York Post.